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JULES DUPUIT AND THE RAILROADS: WHAT IS THE ROLE OF 
THE STATE? 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
The emergence of railroads in France in the nineteenth century gave rise to new debates on 
analytical issues. The focus of interest lay in the fact that they are natural monopolies. In this 
paper, I focus on Jules Dupuit’s work on the operations of the railroad sector. Curiously, he 
seemed to have defended two contrasting positions, opening the way for debate among com-
mentators: on the one hand, he claimed that unlimited competition is the most efficient way to 
operate in the railroad sector; on the other, he stated that State management was the best way 
to run the railroads. I aim to restore the consistency of Dupuit’s positions on the railroads. In 
section II, I discuss Dupuit’s position on unlimited competition in the railroad sector, showing 
that, for him, this kind of competition is not possible in the railroads and that it is not neces-
sarily good for the welfare of society. Therefore, the State should regulate the railroad sector 
either by State management or through concessions. In section III, I specify the conditions 
under which Dupuit believed the State should manage the railroad sector instead of offering 
concessions to private companies. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Jules Dupuit always regarded transportation as a driving force for the wealth and wel-
fare of society. By lowering the effective distance between consumers and the goods which 
satisfy their needs, enhanced transportation increases trade and decreases the price of goods 
(see, for instance, Dupuit, 1853a, pp. 431-2). Although he discussed all the means of transpor-
tation (ship canals, roads and railroads), there are four reasons to emphasize his position con-
cerning the railroad industry. First, Dupuit believed that the development of the railroad in-
dustry would have important consequences for society at the political, economic and social 
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level (Dupuit 1863a, p. 488). He even compared this means of transportation with inventions 
such as the compass and printing (Ibid., p. 484). Second, as remarked by Alain Béraud 
(2005a, p. 19), the emergence of railways brought with it new issues in comparison with other 
means of transport: their operations require a higher degree of coordination between compa-
nies than in other means of transportation, and, for him, this made vertical separation impos-
sible in practice.1 Third, the railroads are a good example of how Dupuit considered that the 
State should function with respect to society. Government intervention should be determined 
on the basis of an impartial criterion: “public utility”. Fourthly, the railways afford us an op-
portunity to discuss Walras’s criticisms of Dupuit’s position concerning the optimal mode of 
operation for the railroads, which Walras considered to be inconsistent. On this particular 
point, Dupuit discussed three modes of operation: private monopoly (or concession2), gov-
ernment operation, and unlimited competition. 
On the one hand, Dupuit claimed that State management was the best way to run the rail-
roads because they are “natural monopolies”3 (1862a, pp. 588-9), and because “railroads… do 
not lend themselves to [unlimited] competition” (Ibid., p. 589), adding that: 
“Private companies are overseen… by an army of civil servants, so that we can wonder whether an in-
dustry, which can only work in these conditions, would not better be operated by State. We do not see 
any economic principle against this solution…” (Ibid., p. 585). 
 
On the other hand, however, Dupuit stated that unlimited competition is the most efficient 
way to operate in the railroad sector (Robert B. Ekelund & Robert F. Hébert 1999, p. 669, 
footnote no. 24; Guy Numa 2012, p. 79). For instance, he wrote that 
                                                      
1
 According to Dupuit, vertical unbundling is impossible because it entails safety problems (see infra, section 
II.2, p. 8). 
2
 In section III (p. 17), I will show that Dupuit’s arguments could be applied to concessionaires as well as non- 
private companies which are not concessionaires. 
3
 Only two articles by Dupuit have been translated into English: “On the measurement of the utility of public 
works” and “On Tolls and Transport Charges”. With regard to the texts for which there is no translation, most of 
the time I offer my own translation. But in some particular cases I appeal to either Ekelund & Hébert’s (1999, 
2012) or Numa’s translations (2012). 
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“yet there would be another way to take this industry [the railroads] away from State control: it would 
be to acknowledge… complete competition and complete freedom. This may be the true economic solu-
tion” (1853a, p. 450; my italics). 
 
While the topic of railroads in Dupuit’s thought has given rise to extensive discussion in the 
literature, the consistency of his position has never formed the central issue of the debate. 
According to Ekelund and Hébert, “Dupuit… identified a natural monopoly argument with 
respect to the railroad” (1999, pp. 323-4). At the same time, however, they claim that: 
“In a static and mechanistic style of economic theory, such natural monopoly would demand govern-
ment intervention, perhaps even nationalization of the railroads, in order to prevent a loss in public utili-
ty owing to monopoly pricing – a view, in fact, that Walras… advanced. However, in Dupuit’s opinion 
this kind of market failure did not demand either of these ‘solutions’. Owing to locational forms of 
competition and the benefits of an open competitive process, wherein high profits were conductive to 
entry, Dupuit thought that competition in railway transportation would be no more injurious or wasteful 
than between butchers and bakers” (Ibid.). 
 
They thus believe that, unlike Dupuit, Walras did not understand the dynamic nature of com-
petition: monopoly is temporary. The inefficiency of the French railway system derived from 
government intervention: while Dupuit “conceded that the French transport market was inef-
ficient, … [he] attributed the cause to government intervention, not to natural monopoly” 
(2003, p. 670). As a result, the State should not operate in the railroad sector because unlim-
ited competition is feasible (2012, p. 104). 
In contrast to Ekelund and Hébert, Béraud (2005a), Manuela Mosca (2008) and Numa 
(2012) maintain that Dupuit advocated State intervention in the railroad industry. Their inter-
pretation is based on Dupuit’s assertion that the railroad industry is a natural monopoly: high 
fixed costs imply increasing returns to scale and, hence, a monopoly. For instance, Mosca 
states that Dupuit “identified the transport network as a situation in which a natural monopoly 
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would have occurred, and claims that he made a first step in the elaboration of the decreasing 
average cost function” (2008, pp. 339-43).4 In the same line, Numa concludes that Dupuit 
“recommended State intervention in the railroad industry, showing that a public monopoly is 
preferable to a private one” (2012, p. 86), adding that the engineer “believed competition was 
the general functioning principle of economic activity. Nevertheless he [Dupuit] also believed 
that, in few industries such as the railroad industry, the facts demonstrated that competition 
was impossible and wasted resources” (Ibid., p. 81). 
According to these interpretations, Dupuit’s positions on the railroads would thus be incon-
sistent: on the one hand, unlimited competition is the most efficient way to operate in the rail-
roads; on the other hand, State management is the best way to run the railway system. 
 
The aim of this article is to show that Dupuit’s thought on the issue of railroads is not 
inconsistent. The consistency of his position becomes clearer as soon as one distinguishes 
between two issues: unlimited competition in the rail transport industry, and the extent of 
State intervention in the railroads. I will deal with these two issues successively. While 
Dupuit considered unlimited competition as an ideal both for society and in the railroads sec-
tor, in Section II I argue that he believed that unlimited competition in the railroads is not nec-
essarily good for the welfare of society and that it was not possible in his own era. That is 
why he maintained that State management of the railroads is superior to private monopoly in 
the event that there is no intermodal competition and no intramodal competition.5 This is what 
I will try to establish in Section III. 
 
                                                      
4
 See also Béraud (2005a, p. 15 and p. 20) and Numa (2012, p. 77). 
5
 Dupuit never used the expressions “intermodal competition” and “intramodal competition”; however, he devel-
oped types of competition which are today called by these names (see infra, section III). 
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II. DUPUIT’S POSITION ON UNLIMITED COMPETITION IN THE 
RAILROAD SECTOR 
Dupuit tackled the issue of the management of railroads on several occasions: in his 
entries “Péages” (1853b) and “Voies de communication” (1853a) in the Dictionnaire de 
l’Économie Politique (DEP); in two debates at the Société d’Économie Politique (SEP) 
(1853c, 1862a); in the Dictionnaire général de la politique (1863a) and Dictionnaire univer-
sel théorique et pratique du commerce et de la navigation (1861a); and finally, in a letter writ-
ten in response to Adolphe Blaise’s criticisms of Dupuit’s position on the fares applied by 
concessionaires (1862b). 
 
Throughout these works, Dupuit adopted a two-step reasoning process. He first con-
sidered unlimited competition as an ideal for society as well as for the operation of the rail-
road sector (II.1). Then he discussed the possibility of unlimited competition in practice. In 
particular, he distinguished between two questions. First, is unlimited competition good for 
the welfare of society in the railroad industry (II.2)? Second, can this kind of competition 
emerge in the railroads from a monopolistic situation (II.3)? 
 
II.1. Unlimited competition: an ideal for society and for the railroad sector 
In line with the engineers of Polytechnique and the Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées 
(François Etner 1987; Bernard Grall 2004, p. 31; Mosca 1998; Cecil O. Smith 1990), Dupuit 
always referred to public interest: for him, this consists in achieving the goals of society. 
More precisely, it aims at maximizing the welfare of society under two constraints:  
• restricting as little as possible natural liberty, that is, the degree of liberty of indi-
viduals in the natural state (1861b, p. 636); 
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• protecting other natural rights6.  
  
According to Dupuit, the welfare of society is a part of the public interest and corresponds to 
the satisfaction of individuals’ needs (Philippe Poinsot 2011). It thus depends on the quantity 
of wealth and population (Poinsot 2010, 2011). 
In order to achieve this goal, the legislator should base his decisions on an impartial criterion: 
Dupuit called this “public utility”, which is a quantitative notion that political economy indi-
cates to the legislator in order to increase wealth and so the welfare of the nation (Ibid.). 
While “public utility” is the only public decision-making principle, it lends itself to a variety 
of solutions according to time and space (1861b, p. 633). In particular, the solution depends 
on the characteristics of the goods, and on the technological, social and economic conditions 
of society and of the period.7 
 
 Because of the nature of public interest, the optimal solution would be to maximize the 
welfare of the nation by ensuring the same degree of individual liberty as in the natural state. 
In practice, this leads Dupuit to adjudicate in favor of unlimited competition, which only takes 
place in what he referred to as “normal industries” (1862a, p. 587) which have three charac-
teristics: i) they are open to any producer; ii) wages depend on the quantity and quality of la-
bor, and iii) the price of goods is determined by the law of supply and demand (Ibid., p. 584). 
The price which results from unlimited competition, which Dupuit referred to as the “natural 
price”8 (1853a, p. 447), is considered as a norm for all sectors of the economy. For instance, 
                                                      
6
 The other natural rights which may be protected entirely by the legislator are self-ownership, self-defense and 
the respect of free contracts and conventions. For a more detailed examination of Dupuit’s conception of public 
interest, see Poinsot (2010, 2011). 
7
 See section III. For more details on the criterion of “public utility”, see Poinsot (2011, pp. 356-74). 
8
 Dupuit’s conception of natural price is thus different from that of Smith and Ricardo as natural price is derived 
from unlimited competition. 
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for the means of transport, he claimed that the “natural toll9 is that which would result from 
the freedom to produce and to consume… and would leave the venal price close to the cost of 
transport” (1853b, p. 529). It follows that the best way to manage the railroad industry is the 
system which offers the price closest to the natural price. Indeed, in his response to Adolphe 
Blaise’s criticisms, Dupuit states: 
“What I wish is that railroad customers pay only the cost of transport, whether passenger or merchan-
dise, just as they would on former means of transport if unlimited competition existed. I am very much 
disposed to adopt any solution that leads to this result” (1862b, p. 597). 
 
Knowing that unlimited competition is regarded by Dupuit as an ideal for society and for the 
railroads, does this mean that it is necessarily good for the welfare of society in practice? This 
is the question that will be answered in the next section. 
 
II.2. Is unlimited competition in the railroad industry necessarily good for the 
welfare of society? 
Dupuit distinguished between two questions: unlimited competition on a railway line 
(which today is called vertical unbundling) on the one hand, and unlimited competition be-
tween parallel railway tracks on the other hand. 
 
Concerning vertical unbundling, one can distinguish between full vertical separation 
and partial vertical separation. The former is institutional separation between infrastructure 
ownership and rail operators (Didier van de Velde & al., 2012, p. 26). Partial vertical separa-
tion corresponds to a situation where a vertical integrated railway company which both owns 
and operates a rail track provides access to competing railway companies through the pay-
ment of tolls. Although the former did not appear in the debates in France, the latter – the pos-
                                                      
9
 As I point out in section II.2, Dupuit rejected vertical separation for the railroads, which led him to consider 
“toll”, “fare” and “price” to be synonymous. 
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sibility for a railway company to use the infrastructure of a vertical integrated railway compa-
ny – was at least provided for in the concession agreement of the Paris-Saint-Germain-en-
Laye in 1835 (Numa, 2009b, pp. 168-70; Ribeill, 1997, p. 32). However, partial vertical sepa-
ration was not translated into reality during the nineteenth century (Numa, 2009b, pp. 168-
70). Dupuit, like many engineers of his time (Numa 2011, p. 4), considered vertical unbun-
dling (full and partial) in the railroads to be harmful for society. Indeed, unlimited competi-
tion in a railway line creates safety problems: “on the railroads, the safety of operation re-
quires that all the transportation expenses be bundled together and concentrated under the 
supervision of a single person” (1853a, p. 443). Ten years later in “Chemins de fer”, Dupuit 
distinguished railroads from roads and ship canals: 
“On roads, on ship canals, competition is unlimited: everybody can use his (her) car or his (her) boat by 
paying a small fee. For reasons of safety, the same would not apply for railroads. At the beginning of 
railroads, it was hoped that there would be possible to have trains of various railway companies on the 
same line; but, after many accidents, it has been acknowledged that it is difficult for each company to 
have the same railway operating rules…” (1863a, p. 480; see also 1861a, p. 471). 
 
For Dupuit, roads, ship canals and railroads are distinguished by the fact that the latter uses a 
technology which requires a high degree of coordination between the relevant companies. His 
argument is very similar to that used today for supporting vertical integration (Didier van de 
Velde et al. 2012, p. 14): he refers to an increase in the complexity of interfaces and so in the 
cost of coordination between railway companies resulting from vertical separation (Dupuit 
1863a, pp. 479-80). However, Dupuit never discussed an argument which is framed today in 
favor of full and partial vertical separation and which could offset the increasing cost of coor-
dination: an increase of competition between railway companies may lead to the provision of 
better services and to a reduction of costs (Didier van de Velde & al., 2012, p. 14). 
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Thus, for Dupuit, although vertical separation (full and partial) is technically possible, a given 
railway service with vertical unbundling is more economically costly than vertical integration. 
This is why he claimed that “their operations [of railroads] exclude [unlimited] competition 
which can only take place between different railway tracks or others means of transportation” 
(1861a, p. 471). Although he did not say so, it results from this rejection of vertical unbun-
dling that he does not distinguish between the building/ownership of the railway network and 
the operation of the network, something which led him to treat the owner of track and the rail 
operator as synonymous.10 Thus, unlike economists today, he assumed that there is no distinc-
tion between the toll paid to the owner of the rail infrastructure and the user fare for the rail 
service.11 For Dupuit, the user fare12 should cover both the cost of building and maintaining 
the tracks and the network, and the cost of running the train on the tracks (see section III.1.1). 
Dupuit’s imprecision may explain why the historians of economic thought have developed 
different interpretations on his position on the issue of railroads. 
 
Dupuit’s discussion of the virtue of unlimited competition between parallel railway 
tracks can be found in “Péages” (1853b) and “Voies de communication (I)” (1853a) in the 
DEP, and in a debate at the SEP concerning monopoly in the railroad industry (1853c). And, 
curiously, he assumes two opposite positions: on the one hand, in “Péages” and “Du mono-
pole des chemins de fer”, he denounces the negative consequences of unlimited competition 
for society. On the other hand, in “Voies de communication (I)” (1853a), he presents unlim-
ited competition as the most efficient means of managing the railroads and increasing the wel-
fare of society. One might argue that he changed his position; but this argument cannot be 
sustained, since all these articles were written in 1853. 
                                                      
10
 This implication was suggested to me by one of the referees, to whom I offer sincere thanks. 
11
 Echoing Dupuit, when speaking of railroads I will consider “toll”, “fare” and “price” to be synonymous. 
12
 In accordance with his conception of ethical justice, Dupuit claimed that the means of transportation must be 
financed by users. Dupuit only recommends taxing all members of society (users and non-users) for roads be-
cause this cannot be achieved fairly and economically. For more details, see Poinsot (2010, 2011, pp. 141-6). 
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On the one hand, in “Péages”, Dupuit claims that unlimited competition is harmful to the 
wealth of society, adopting the following rationale: he imagines an initial firm with monopoly 
power which yields extra profit. A new firm wishes to enter the market. According to him, if 
this were to occur, it would diminish the revenue of the entering firm and diminish the reve-
nue of the incumbent. Dupuit concludes: “the new company would have significantly harmed 
the incumbent one…; instead of one good deal, there would be two bad ones” (1853b, p. 520). 
But on the other hand, in “Voies de communication (I)” (1853a), he claims that unlimited 
competition in the railroad industry increases the welfare of the nation: “with regard to the 
building of railway tracks and means of transport, complete competition and freedom is the 
true economic solution” (1853a, p. 450). Unlike his contemporaries,13 Dupuit affirmed that 
unlimited competition in the railroad industry would not create a greater waste of resources 
for the nation than in any other industry. In reference to the example of the two companies 
operating a service between Paris and Versailles (one via the left bank and the other via the 
right bank), he claims: 
“A rival company builds a second, manifestly parallel [line]. As a result, the nation loses a capital nearly 
equivalent to the value of the latter’s track. The two railroads from Paris to Versailles exemplify the 
consequences of unlimited competition in railroad construction. It must be acknowledged that this caus-
es a serious disadvantage; but, to our way of thinking, it is much less than what happens under monopo-
ly, and perhaps even less than the consequences of State operation. It is largely unnoticed that this dis-
advantage, which made such a powerful impression when these lines were being constructed, is present 
in all kinds of industry. It is quite evident that the parceling out [of business] among a large number of 
vendors raises enormously the capital necessary for production to take place, which is more than occa-
sionally lost, causing costs to multiply. Walking the streets of a major city, for example, we are struck 
by the proximity of one tailor next to another, one cabinet maker beside another… To what advantage? 
One of the two is evidently sufficient to satisfy the public need…” (Ibid., pp. 451-2). 
 
                                                      
13
 The engineers of Ponts et Chausées and of the Mines worried about the profitability of these railway tracks. 
See Yves Breton & Gérard Klotz (2009, p. 451, footnote no. 54). 
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He concludes that “unlimited competition, regarding the means of transport, would not cause 
more disadvantages than it would elsewhere” (Ibid.). 
 
Dupuit’s position on the virtue of unlimited competition between parallel railway 
tracks for society is thus ambiguous. We will see that his change of mind is simply due to the 
fact that he considered that unlimited competition was impossible in the railroad sector in 
France in his period. 
 
II.3. The characteristics of railroads prevent unlimited competition 
Dupuit stated that railroads are monopolies (1863a, p. 480) and that State intervention 
is necessary in order to limit the harmful consequences of monopoly, but “when railway oper-
ations are subjected to the law of competition, there will be no reason for State interven-
tion…” (1862a, p. 587). He adds: 
“It would be a happy occurrence if we were to find a means of eliminating some of the disadvantages 
facing companies which result from a monopolistic situation and to find a way of stimulating competi-
tion” (Ibid.). 
 
In order to clarify his position, Dupuit differentiated three kinds of industry in society: a) 
normal industries, b) collective industries, and c) industries which are “necessarily monopo-
lies” (Ibid., pp. 584-5). They are distinguished by three characteristics: i) the capital to pro-
duce goods, ii) the way workers’ wages are set, and iii) the degree of competition in the mar-
ket. 
As mentioned above (see p. 6), in normal industry there are no barriers to entry, workers are 
paid according to their work, and the price of goods is determined by the law of supply and 
demand. As a result, in these industries, government intervention is not required: 
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“The State can only produce with workers whose salary… is proportional neither to the quality, nor the 
quantity of products. As these workers are not stimulated by personal interest, which is the most power-
ful rationale in ordinary acts of life, they would produce much less than free workers [whose] wage [de-
pends] on merit and the quantity of individual work” (Ibid.). 
 
Conversely, collective industries (i.e. ironworks, credit industry) need huge amounts of capi-
tal (1862a, p. 584) and workers are in the same position as civil servants because “their wages 
are fixed and independent of their work” (Ibid.).14 Consequently, it is impossible “to invoke 
against State management of collective industries the argument of personal interest” (Ibid.). 
However, as private companies are in competition with each other, the State is less efficient 
than private firms. Dupuit used three arguments to justify this position. First, unlike in the 
case of public management, competition stimulates firms “to satisfy users’ tastes” (Ibid.). 
Second, in contrast to civil servants, workers in collective industries can be laid off due to 
firm bankruptcy: indeed, a “forge, a mine, a badly managed bank soon go bankrupt and so all 
their workers lose their wages” (Ibid.). Third, firms in collective industries are price takers: 
“the price of their services is set by the law of supply and demand, and the consumer cannot 
complain” (Ibid). Then, “if the State were to operate a forge or bank, it would experience no 
rivalry; as a result, its production would be worse than these big companies” (1862a, p. 584). 
That is why government intervention is not necessary in collective industries. 
Dupuit identified a third type of industry requiring huge capital and in which workers’ wag-
es are set independently of their work. Unlike collective industries, firms in these industries 
can set a monopoly price: 
“the situation is different for some industries, i.e. railroads, because they are inevitably monopolies. On 
the one hand, their workers… are not concerned by the result of their works as they are in the collective 
                                                      
14
 Dupuit made the same point in his review of Molinari’s Question d’économie politique et de droit public. See 
Dupuit (1863b, pp. 128-9). 
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industries; and, on the other hand, they are not worried… by users’ needs because consumers cannot use 
other means of transports” (Ibid., pp. 584-5). 
 
Dupuit named these industries “natural monopolies” (Ibid., p. 587)15 in contrast to “artificial 
monopolies” (Ibid.). While artificial monopolies (Banque de France, Crédit Foncier, Crédit 
Agricole…) arise by law, natural monopolies derive from the “nature of things”. As a result, 
the “drawbacks of artificial monopolies are easy to break, as it is simply a question of elimi-
nating the monopolies themselves. This solution cannot be applied to natural monopolies” 
(Ibid., p. 589).  
 
For Dupuit, the rail industry is emblematic of the natural monopoly. Two points need 
to be made to clarify his position: the first deals with the reasons why he considers that rail-
roads are a natural monopoly; the second looks at the distinction between infrastructure and 
operation in relation to this issue of natural monopoly. 
This industry’s character as a natural monopoly arises from the existence of barriers to entry. 
Indeed, in a previous debate at SEP (1853c) and in his article “Péages” in the DEP (1853b), 
he mentions two kinds of barrier to entry in the railroads: the high level of fixed costs in abso-
lute value, and the inherent advantages of the incumbent. 
First, Dupuit considered fixed costs in two ways: in relative value and in absolute value.16 
While, in the railroads as well as any kind of industry, fixed costs correspond to ¾ of annual 
expenses (Ibid., pp. 528-9), they are, in absolute value, much higher in the railroads than in 
any other industry. This entails barriers to entry because “once a firm is established with a 
capital of 40, 50 or 100 million, etc., no rival companies… can be set up, because this sum of 
                                                      
15
 According to Dupuit, natural monopolies include the railroads, gas distribution, water distribution, the tele-
graph, etc. See Dupuit (Ibid, pp. 588-9). 
16
 This distinction has not been made by Béraud (2005a), Mosca (2008) and Numa (2012). However, it is im-
portant as it is the only way to understand the two subsequent statements by Dupuit: on the one hand, fixed costs 
stand in the same proportion in every industry and, on the other hand, fixed costs are higher in the railroad sector 
than in every other industry. 
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money is always difficult to collect…” (1853c, p. 574). The capacity to build new infrastruc-
ture is thus limited to a small number of people (1853b, p. 520). 
Second, Dupuit adds that even where firms have enough capital to build parallel railroads, “as 
the incumbent company is the only one in the market, the new one cannot compete with the 
first one, and the profit made by one is not enough for two” (1853b, p. 520).17. As stated by 
Mosca (2008) and Numa (2012), the first firm always has advantages on the choice of the 
road, clientele habits, and so on: 
“it is highly probable that the first company, which, as the first company, was the first to choose a route, 
chose the best one… therefore the next company’s route will be necessarily inferior in terms of land 
quality, wealth, population…. Then it arrives after the customers of the railroad have formed habits and 
established relationships with it; it can only hope to take half of the clientele of the incumbent company 
[which insure law benefits to the entering firm]…”.18 
 
As regards the elements which are subject to natural monopoly, these can pertain to: 
i. The infrastructure 
ii. The infrastructure and operation 
For roads and ship canals, Dupuit was explicit: it is only the infrastructure which is subject to 
natural monopoly (1861a, p. 471; 1863a, p. 480). For railroads, he was more ambiguous, 
which again may explain that historians of economic thought have developed different inter-
pretations on his analysis of railroads. He sometimes refers only to infrastructure to justify the 
characteristic natural monopoly of railroads (1853c, p. 574), while sometimes he argues that it 
is both the infrastructure and operation which are subject to natural monopoly. For instance, 
in “Péages”, he states that the “means of transportation [as railroads], whose construction and 
operation require substantial expenses, are monopolies…” (1853b, p. 520). Furthermore, 
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 The same argument was used by Dupuit for another natural monopoly: the water supply network. See (1852, 
p. 540). 
18
 (1853b, p. 520). See also Dupuit (1853c, p. 574). 
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when he discusses this issue, it seems that Dupuit is confusing two different questions: the 
possibility of vertical separation, and which elements are subject to natural monopoly. 
One explanation for Dupuit’s lack of clarity is that his discussion of natural monopoly refers 
to the possibility of unlimited competition in the railroads. From this point of view, whatever 
elements are subject to natural monopoly (infrastructure, or infrastructure and operation), as 
soon as he rejects vertical separation, both cases lead to the same result: unlimited competi-
tion is not possible in the railroads. Indeed, if the rail infrastructure and operation are natural 
monopolies, it is easy to understand why unlimited competition is not possible.19 Imagine 
now that infrastructure is the only element that is subject to natural monopoly. It follows from 
Dupuit’s rejection of vertical separation – which means that there is a relationship between 
the ownership of infrastructure and railway operation – that a natural monopoly on building 
and ownership implies a monopoly on railway operation. Thus, in both cases unlimited com-
petition is impossible. 
 
For Dupuit, the railroad industry is thus a “de facto monopoly” (Ibid., p. 519) and a 
“monopoly can draw a revenue from it that is superior to that of capitals submitted to compe-
tition” (Ibid., p. 520). Nevertheless, this situation may change in the future with the evolution 
of technology: some sectors of the economy in which unlimited competition was possible in 
the past became natural monopolies through the technological revolution. For instance:  
“When public lighting was oil lighting, competition was unlimited; with gas, which required burying 
the gas pipe, public lighting became a monopoly. The evolution of some industries change their own na-
ture and we have to accept the consequences in terms of management” (1862a, p. 588). 
 
Dupuit assumed that the opposite could be true for railroads: that is why, in the future, unlim-
ited competition could be possible in the railroad sector. In his own period, however, the bar-
                                                      
19
 It should be mentioned that this does not imply that State must build and operate the rail track. See section III, 
below. 
16 
 
riers to entry prevented such competition, and the company which exploits the existing track 
does indeed benefit from a de facto monopoly. This company will set a price that maximizes 
its profits. Thus, intervention by the State is justified, and its form has to be determined. But 
should the State grant the track to a private company via concessions, or exploit it directly? 
This is the object of next section. 
 
III. STATE MANAGEMENT VS. PRIVATE MONOPOLY (OR CONCES-
SIONS) 
When Dupuit addresses the issue of the best way to manage the railroads, he seems to 
draw a comparison between concessions and State management. This is not surprising if we 
consider the period in which he was writing. Between 1823 and 1832, railroad concessions 
could not transport passengers but only build and operate goods-transport networks, in partic-
ular for coal. While government intervention was kept to a minimum with regard to financial 
assistance and the operation of railway lines, the State granted perpetual concessions. In 1833, 
the government began to control the concessionaires for the development of passenger 
transport: on April 26, 1833, the concession length was reduced to 99 years and a maximum 
legal fare was created to control the fare applied by concessionaires.20 
However, Dupuit’s arguments could be applied to concessionaires with the maximum legal 
fare as well as non-concessionaire private companies. For instance, as I will show in the next 
section (see section III.1.1), the main disadvantage of a monopoly is the toll rate applied by a 
private firm seeking to maximize its revenues. Then, the only difference between the conces-
sionaire and the private company is that, even though a higher toll rate increases its revenue, 
the former only equates its price to the maximum legal fare. That is why I use the term “com-
pany” to speak of concessionaires as well as non-concessionaire private companies. 
                                                      
20
 For more detailed information on the development of the railroads in France, see François Caron (1997) and 
Numa (2009a, pp. 107-12; 2012, pp. 73-6). 
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As stated above (section II.1), Dupuit believed that the decision on whether to support 
government intervention in the economy should be based on “public utility”. State manage-
ment is required when it can increase the quantity of wealth for society more than any other 
kind of management. In accordance with “public utility”, Dupuit offered various answers to 
the issue of how best to run the railroads.21 In particular, he distinguished between railway 
lines in which there is no intermodal competition (the individual has no choice between dif-
ferent means of transportation (i.e. roads and ship canals) for the same Origin-Destination 
(O/D)) and no intramodal competition (the individual has no choice between different railway 
lines for the same O/D) on the one hand (III.1), and railway tracks in which there is intermod-
al competition and/or intramodal competition on the other (III.2). 
 
III.1. A State-operated system is superior to private monopoly in the event of no 
intermodal competition and no intramodal competition 
 
To identify the cases in which there is no intermodal and no intramodal competition, 
Dupuit discussed the criteria for the choice of the mode of transportation and the availability 
of alternative options in terms of travel. 
Although the choice of the mode of transport for him depends on two criteria – speed and 
transport cost –, according to the nature of the commodity to be transported (passenger, per-
ishable freight and non-perishable merchandise), one criteria will be more important than the 
other.22 
When speed is the most important criteria for the choice of the mode of transportation, such 
as for passengers (1863a, p. 480) as well as for perishable freight, the railroads enjoy a huge 
                                                      
21
 Traditionally, the secondary literature claims that the “pragmatic” approach of Dupuit was in complete con-
trast to the ethical and ideological approach of Léon Walras, since the latter justified State intervention in the 
railroad industry according to the notion of service public. For more information, see Béraud (2005a), Ekelund & 
Hébert (2003) and Numa (2012). 
22
 It should be mentioned that Clément Colson in Transports & Tarifs (1908, pp. 633) also claimed that speed is 
the most important criteria for passengers, while for freight it is transport cost. 
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advantage over roads and ship canals (1861a, p. 472).23 Then, there is no intermodal competi-
tion and no intramodal competition, whatever the availability of alternative options in terms 
of travel may be. Dupuit’s affirmation is questionable: in fact, the validity of his argument 
depends upon certain hypotheses regarding the value of time for individuals. For instance, if 
alternative means of transport are available, his argument is only consistent if he assumes that 
the value of time of individuals is very high. Otherwise, there is either intermodal or in-
tramodal competition. More generally, the more highly the individual values time, the lower 
the intermodal or intramodal competition will be. 
Unlike passengers and perishable freight, transport cost is the most important factor in the 
choice of mode of transport for non-perishable merchandise: the advantage of railroads in 
terms of speed is no longer relevant. In that case, the existence of intermodal competition 
and/or intramodal competition only depends on the availability of alternative options in terms 
of travel: the absence of any alternative options implies no intermodal competition and no 
intramodal competition. This is what Dupuit meant when he claimed that if “I wish to 
transport merchandise from Paris to Lille, I have to pay the railway company toll, because 
there is no other choice” (1853b, p. 519). 
 
Thus, there is no intermodal competition and no intramodal competition either if speed 
is the most important criteria for the choice of the mode of transportation, or there is no alter-
native option available. For both cases, Dupuit’s comparison between operation by the State 
and by a company is based on two dimensions: fares applied to users (III.1.1) and the effi-
                                                      
23
 Due to the Restauration (1815-1830) and the Monarchie de Juillet (1830-1848), the road network and the 
waterways network were well developed in France in the nineteenth century (Caron, 1997, pp. 50-4; Pierre Léon, 
1976; Emile Levasseur, 1912). However, it should be noted that, for freight transport, the historians of econom-
ics (Caron, 1997, pp. 352-8; Numa, 2009b, p. 211), as well as Alfred Picard (1887), most often mentioned ship 
canals as a significant competitor for railroads. For the transport of passengers and freight, the road network only 
seemed relevant to connect the points which were not served by railroads (for instance see Caron, 1997, pp. 345-
52). This might seem surprising, and will be clarified in a future article. 
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ciency of the organization structure (III.1.2). I will now go to Dupuit’s arguments in favor of 
the State-operated system with regard to fares applied to users. 
 
III.1.1. Uniform price versus price discrimination 
When price discrimination is not applied by the railway’s owner, the State seeks to 
maximize the “public utility” of the infrastructure, whereas a private company wants to max-
imize its own revenue: 
“In price setting, two points of view are possible. In the case of a private company, it would obviously 
seek to obtain the highest revenue… If it is the State that exploits the industry, as it is likely that it will 
want to cover the interest of capital borrowed and the maintenance costs, it would charge a much lower 
rate than the company. The lower the toll, the more users there are and the more the means of transpor-
tation is useful” (Dupuit 1853b, p. 524; see also 1853c, p. 575). 
 
A government wants “a fixed sum representing interest on the capital spent for construction, 
maintenance cost and perhaps amortization” (1849 [1962], p. 11).24 As the demand function is 
given by  (1844 [1952], p. 107)25 with  the quantity transported and  the toll, 
then, according to Dupuit, the State’s equation is (Ibid.): 
 
[1]   
 
with  representing construction costs and the interest on the capital borrowed. 
                                                      
24
 In this quotation, Dupuit speaks of all means of transportation. As mentioned before (section II.2), he rejected 
vertical separation for railroads, which led him to treat the ownership and the operation of the network as syno-
nyms. Thus, user fares should cover both the cost of building and the maintenance costs of the railway track, as 
well as the cost of running the train on the tracks. 
25
 For more information on the construction of the demand function in Dupuit’s thought, see Béraud (2005b), 
Norman E. Daniel (1971), Arnaud Diemer (2003), Ekelund (2008), Ekelund & William P. Gramm (1970), 
Ekelund & Hébert (1999) and (2002), R. W. Houghton (1958), Poinsot (2011, pp. 361-70), Ralph W Pfouts 
(1953, p. 316), Jean-Marc Siroën (1995, pp. 36-41) and Stigler (1950, pp. 313-4). 
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Whereas the State puts a price to cover the construction costs and the interest on the capital 
borrowed, a private company wishes to maximize its revenues, which means that it will solve 
the following equation (1844 [1952], p. 108): 
 
[2]   
Suppose (Graph 126) that  is the solution to [1] whereas  solves [2].  equals B + D and 
the revenue of the private company is the area D + E. The “utilité relative” (relative utility 
hereafter) of consumers – which is the difference between users’ reserve prices (what Dupuit 
refers to as the “utilité absolue” – what I will call absolute utility – of the individuals27) and 
the price – is higher in the case of public management (area C + E + F) than private monopoly 
(F). Consequently, deadweight loss is lower for public management (area A) than the private 
firm (A + B + C), and, in comparison to a private monopoly, public management increases the 
absolute utility (or the “public utility”) of the infrastructure – the sum of the owner’s revenue 
and the relative utility of consumers – by B + C. 
                                                      
26
 Echoing Dupuit, I put  on the y-axis and the fare ( ) on the x-axis. 
27
 The traditional reading of Dupuit interprets his concepts of absolute utility and relative utility in a Marshallian 
way. In other words, these concepts are generally considered as being synonymous with, respectively, the indi-
vidual welfare (or utility function) and the consumer’s surplus. See Ekelund & Gramm (1970), Ekelund & Hé-
bert (1999), Houghton (1958), Mosca (1998), Pfouts (1953). For alternatives interpretations, see Maurice Allais 
(1989, pp. 164-5), Béraud (2005b), Poinsot (2011, pp. 205-22). 
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With uniform price, a natural monopoly should be managed by State. 
 
Now let’s see what happens, for Dupuit, with price discrimination. According to him, 
a uniform price is indeed not the optimal system of taxation. In order to compare different 
modes of taxation, two dimensions are considered: 
i. Does the type of taxation enable construction costs and capital interest (and op-
eration costs for railroads) to be paid? 
ii. What is the best mode of taxation to maximize “public utility”? In other words, 
what is the fare system which enables all individuals to use the infrastructure? 
The second point may seem surprising to modern economists: but it derives from the im-
portance that Dupuit assigns to the “public utility”. Indeed, what was important to him was 
not the relative utility of consumers but the “public utility” of infrastructure: a method of taxa-
tion which does not prevent any individual from using the infrastructure is better than any 
other method of taxation, whatever the relative utility of consumers are.  
While he considered that a uniform price which repays construction costs and capital interest 
(and operation costs for railroads) is equivalent to price discrimination in terms of dimension 
A 
C 
B 
D E F 
Public management Private monopoly 
Revenue: B + D 
Relative utility of consumers (RUC): C + E + F 
Deadweight loss: A 
Revenue: D + E 
RUC: F 
Deadweight loss: A + B + C 
Graph 1: Variation of deadweight loss between public management and private monopoly 
22 
 
(i), Dupuit was in favor of the latter because “public utility” is higher with price discrimina-
tion than with a uniform price (dimension (ii)) (1853b, pp. 528-9). 
According to Dupuit, the optimal system of taxation was perfect price discrimination in order 
to maximize “public utility”: the “skill of the operator is thus to set the maximum price for 
any passenger and any merchandise that would lead them to use the railway track” (Dupuit 
1863a, p. 481). While perfect price discrimination is not possible in practice, Dupuit argued 
that this is the kind of taxation which should be sought by the owner of a road.28 Indeed, he 
claimed that the latter should differentiate between consumer categories, set various prices 
according to the users’ elasticity of demand (Ekelund & Hébert 1999, p. 195; Mosca 1998),29 
and use spatial discrimination (Diemer 2000; Ekelund & Hébert 1999, pp. 259-61; Ekelund 
1970; Ekelund & Yeung-Nan Shieh 1986). Suppose (Graph 2, p. 23), for instance, that the 
railway owner distinguishes between three categories of user: first-class users have to pay 
price  to use the infrastructure, whereas second-class and third-class users pay  and  
respectively. There are ,  and  users in first, second and third class. Compared to uni-
form price (  in Graph 2), the revenue of the railway’s owner increases by B + I and the 
deadweight loss decreases by B + C. Consequently, the “public utility” of the infrastructure 
increases with regard to uniform price.30 
                                                      
28
 The railway companies in France during the nineteenth century practiced strong price discrimination. For more 
details, see Caron (1997, pp. 386-9) and Numa (2009b, pp. 117-9). 
29
 Dupuit advised the operator to charge higher tolls on captive consumers. 
30
 The result is ambiguous for the relative utility of consumers. In our example, price discrimination will only 
decrease the relative utility of consumers if  is larger than . 
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As price discrimination increases the owner’s revenue, the private company, as well as 
the government, should prefer it to uniform price. This suggests that, for Dupuit, State man-
agement is equivalent to private monopoly with regard to “public utility” in the situation of 
price discrimination. Nevertheless, he seemed to prefer government management, arguing that 
civil servants are more efficient than “private servants” in the case of no intermodal competi-
tion and no intramodal competition. 
 
III.1.2. Civil servants are more efficient than “private servants” 
According to Dupuit, the State is more organized31 than a private company because 
civil servants are more efficient than workers in a private monopoly, who can also be referred 
to as “private servants”.  For instance, he claimed that: 
“economists’ arguments to refuse State management of the majority of industries cannot be applied to 
the railroad industry. When a producer… earns a wage corresponding to his product quality and quanti-
ty, he provides good work and produces as much as possible, whereas he works… as little as possible 
                                                      
31
 He considered that the only advantage of a private company over State ownership relates to the choice of 
route, because political considerations have no impact on companies’ choice (1863a, p. 482). 
A 
C B 
A 
D E 
F 
 
 
G H I J 
Graph 2 : Comparison of deadweight loss between uniform price ( ) and third class price discrimination 
( , ,  for the consumers of the first, second and third class) 
Uniform price 
Revenue: D + E + G + H  
RUC: F + I + J 
Deadweight loss: A + B + C 
Third class price discrimination 
Revenue: B + D + E + G + H + I  
RUC: C + F + J 
Deadweight loss: A 
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when, as a civil servant, he earns a fixed salary…In the railroad industry, all workers earn fixed wages 
and they are not interested in the welfare of the company any more than civil servants are of the welfare 
of the State” (1863a, p. 482). 
 
And he added that “the workers of a company… are a kind of civil servant; from the length-
man who straightens the tracks to the director who manages the operations, the only incentive 
to stimulate their natural laziness is their conscience” (1853, p. 448). Dupuit invoked two ar-
guments to support his position: i) the State’s organization against the laziness of civil serv-
ants, and ii) civil servants’ desire to serve the society: 
“Society has taken special and numerous precautions against the indifference, laziness and lack of integ-
rity of civil servants. Although less powerful than personal interest, considerations resulting from the 
honor of serving the State are motives which have an impact which cannot be overlooked” (Ibid., p. 
449). 
 
Moreover, unlike the workers of a private company, the work of civil servants is better con-
trolled by the press and citizens: “public opinion and the press have some control over civil 
servants which does not exist for the workers of companies because the latter are seen as pri-
vate producers criticism of whom would seem to be slanderous” (1863a, p. 482; see also 
1862a, p. 586). 
 
Thus, government management of a natural monopoly is more efficient with regard to 
“public utility” than a private monopoly for railway lines when there is no intermodal compe-
tition and no intramodal competition. The situation is different when there is competition 
from roads, ship canals or other railway lines. 
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III.2. Private monopoly is superior to State management in case of intermodal 
competition and/or intramodal competition 
In his letter reproduced in the Journal des Économistes, Adolphe Blaise (1862) criti-
cized Dupuit, arguing that railroad concessionary companies do not set prices equal to the 
maximum legal fare. In fact, for Dupuit, this is only true for railway tracks transporting non-
perishable goods because in that case there is intermodal competition and/or intramodal com-
petition. In the case of non-perishable freight, the choice of transportation is determined by 
the costs of transportation: as speed is no longer relevant, a railway track loses its advantage 
over roads, canals and other railway lines. Intermodal competition and/or intramodal competi-
tion puts pressure on the railway line’s owner to keep their prices down: “If railway compa-
nies set their prices, in certain circumstances, below the legal price for merchandise, this is 
solely the result of competition from other means of transport” (1862b, p. 595). In other 
words, there is no point in the railway track owner setting a high price because freight 
transport is intermodal (Ekelund & Hébert 2003, p. 670): high tolls lead merchants to use ei-
ther other means of transport or other railway tracks. However, Dupuit criticizes Blaise’s as-
sertion that this would show that company interests coincide with consumer interests: the 
railway line’s owner always sets his price to maximize his revenues. 
Thus, the owner of a railway track in which there is intermodal competition and/or intramodal 
competition will set his prices below the maximum legal price. This will lead him to set dif-
ferent prices according to the freight transported and the degree of competition. Consequently, 
railway tracks are in the situation of collective industries because they can go bankrupt (see 
section II-3). As a result, government intervention is not required. 
 
In brief, the State should operate railway lines in the case of no intermodal competi-
tion and no intramodal competition (passengers and perishable freight), whereas its interven-
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tion is not required for railway tracks where there is competition from either other means of 
transportation or other railway lines. While Dupuit tackled the issue of mixed railway tracks 
(transport of passengers and freight) from the point of view of taxation, he did not discuss the 
most efficient way to manage them. Nevertheless, in “Voies de communication” he concludes 
that every “transport means that is a monopoly must be operated by the State; every transport 
means that is accessible to competition must be operated by private industry” (1853a, p. 
452).32 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Beyond the richness of Dupuit’s thought, his position on the railroads of the nineteenth 
century echoes contemporary debates over the introduction of competition in the European 
railway system. Most of these debates lead to favoring the separation of the railway infra-
structure operator from the railway companies; and this is particularly salient if we consider 
the position of the European Commission (EC, Directive 91/440). However, empirical studies 
are ambiguous on the results of vertical separation in order to boost competition on the rail-
roads and increase rail transport’s market share as compared to cars and airplanes. For in-
stance, some studies (Pedro Cantos et al. 2010; Guido Friebel et al. 2010) reach the conclu-
sion that the effect of vertical separation on costs in Europe is positive. But many others per-
ceive either the absence of correlation between vertical separation and costs (Cantos & al. 
2012; Heinke Wetzel 2008), or a negative correlation (Christian Growitsch & Heike Wetzel 
2009; Anne Jensen & Petra Stelling 2007).33 
                                                      
32
 Numa criticizes Ekelund & Hébert’s translation of this sentence in Secret origins of modern microeconomics 
(1999, p. 324). In their response to Numa, they (2012) claim that “Numa’s complaint about our mistranslation is 
less central to Dupuit’s ‘ultimate position’ than he thinks, but for the record, Numa translated Dupuit correct-
ly…”. So I appeal to Numa’s translation. 
33
 For a survey on the empirical studies regarding the effects of vertical separation in the railway sector, see 
Fumitoshi Mizutani & Shuji Uranishi (2012) and van de Velde (2012). 
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Perhaps one lesson could be drawn from Dupuit: there is no “one-size-fits-all” solution for all 
rail transport systems in Europe. This is in line with the position of Guido Friebel et al. (2007) 
and Russell Pittman (2005): for instance, the latter claims that “the model [vertical separation] 
has not always worked out as well in practice as it has on the blackboard. In recent years it has 
become apparent that the model is more likely to be successful in some sectors than in others, and 
in some countries at some times than in other countries at other times” (Pittman 2005, p. 181). 
 
More generally, it is also interesting to note that the issue of the railroads is representa-
tive of how Dupuit considered the function of government in society. In line with the French 
liberals of the nineteenth century, he argued that the optimal solution is unlimited competi-
tion. However, unlike them, he considered that State intervention is necessary to increase the 
welfare of the nation. This is typically the case for property rights, for instance, where Dupuit 
distinguished between land property and intellectual property rights. While property rights 
over land should be individual, intellectual property rights should be managed by the State: 
his rationale consisted in stating again the superiority of unlimited competition, and then 
stressing the special features of intellectual property rights which lead him to defend State 
intervention for intellectual works (pictures, books, etc.) and inventions. He offers two argu-
ments as to why individual appropriation of land is better than collective appropriation: first, 
agricultural output is higher for the former than for the latter, since it stimulates self-interest; 
second, individual propriety rights over land increases the intellectual satisfaction of the prop-
erty owner and his sense of responsibility (Dupuit 1861c, pp. 611-2). Thus, he considered 
that, unlike land, intellectual works and inventions demonstrate the characteristics of what 
modern economists refer to as public goods: thus, Government intervention is required. In 
Dupuit’s opinion, the optimum solution would consist in passing works into the public do-
main, but there would be no incentive to create and innovate. Copyright and patents are nec-
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essary to give creators and innovators an incentive. As with the railroads, Dupuit distin-
guished between the case of literary and artistic works and inventions: the duration of copy-
rights should be lower than that of patents because invention is a cumulative process (1861b, 
pp. 629-30). Moreover, Dupuit claimed that the duration of patents should depend on the sec-
tor and should vary according to time and space (Ibid., pp. 632-3). 
 
Thus, according to Dupuit, it is impossible to assert unequivocally that a sector should 
be operated by the State. The scope of government intervention should be determined accord-
ing to the criterion of “public utility”. The economist has to look at the conditions of society, 
which means that the solution depends on the technological, social and economic conditions 
of society and on the characteristics of the goods. 
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